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COMMENTS
THE INSANITY DEFENSE: SHOULD LOUISIANA
CHANGE THE RULES?*
When John Hinkley, Jr. was found not guilty by reason of insanity
in the attempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan, new fuel
was added to an already heated debate over the social value of the
insanity defense in criminal cases. The jury's verdict focused the na-
tion's attention on the insanity defense, and public outrage spread
from coast to coast.' Newspapers examined the value of the defense
to society at large,' and public pressure induced state' and national
legislative bodies to undertake an evaluation of the current state of
the law.
Sensational cases like this one inflame the public at large, which
does not understand the reasons for permitting a defendant to avoid
responsibility because he was mentally defective. The public perceives
only unjust results-a guilty person is not punished because medical
experts say he was insane at the time of the act. It is difficult for
the average person, who perceives himself as sane, to comprehend
a state of mind in which he cannot distinguish right from wrong. To
such a person, insanity is nothing more than a "technicality" that per-
mits a defendant the luxury of hospitalization and early release rather
than the harshness of the penitentiary.
Since public sentiment has a profound impact upon legislative
bodies, the temptation to react quickly is great. However, it would
be both dangerous and foolish to modify our laws on insanity without
an examination of the available alternatives.
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* The author gratefully acknowledges the incisive assistance of Professor George
W. Pugh in the preparation of this comment.
1. NEWSWEEK devoted its cover story in the May 24, 1982 issue to a discus-
sion of the insanity defense and its future. The Insanity Plea on Trial, NEWSWEEK,
May 24, 1982, at 56; see also Cohen, Hinkley Verdict Will Force Change in Either-Or
Laws, Sunday Advocate (Baton Rouge), June 27, 1982, at 3-B, col. 1.
2. See, e.g., Revamping the Insanity Defense, Wall St. J., January 21, 1983, at 22,
col. 1; Insanity Plea on Trial, N.Y. Times, August 8, 1982, S 6, at 16, col. 1.
3. The 1982 Regular Session of the Louisiana legislature took the following ac-
tion regarding the insanity defense:
(a) memorialized the United States Congress to study federal law regard-
ing the insanity defense. La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 225, 8th Reg. Sess. (1982).
(b) Introduced and referred to committee three bills intended to provide
a verdict of "guilty but insane." La. H.B. 1423, S 1, 8th Reg. Sess. (1982);
La. S.B. 503, S 1 & S.B. 681, S 1, 8th Reg. Sess. (1982). All three bills
died in committee.
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Present Louisiana Law
Assuming that a defendant is mentally competent to stand trial,'
Louisiana puts the onus on the defendant to prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, his insanity at the time of the offense.' The law is
clear that insanity is an affirmative defense; it must be specially
pleaded,6 and the defendant must give notice to the state of his inten-
tion to use evidence of insanity at trial.' Only when the defendant
specially pleads insanity is evidence of his mental condition at the
time of the alleged offense admissible In addition, a presumption of
sanity relieves the state of any burden to prove initially the sanity
of the defendant To be found not guilty by reason of insanity, the
defendant must overcome this presumption by a preponderance of the
evidence."
Constitutional Considerations
A threshhold question in nearly all matters of criminal law and
procedure is whether a proposed change is constitutional. The issue
4. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 641-649. The test is whether, "as a result of mental disease
or defect, a defendant presently lacks the capacity to understand the proceedings against
him or to assist in his defense." LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 641.
5. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 652 provides: "The defendant has the burden of
establishing the defense of insanity at the time of the offense by a preponderance
of the evidence."
6. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 552 provides:
"There are four kinds of pleas to the indictment at the arraignment:
(1) Guilty;
(2) Not guilty;
(3) Not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity; or
(4) Nolo contendere ....
7. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 726(A) provides:
A. If a defendant intends to introduce testimony relating to a mental disease,
defect, or other condition bearing upon the issue of whether he had the mental
state required for the offense charged, he shall not later than ten days prior
to trial or such reasonable time as the court may permit, notify the district
attorney in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice with the
clerk.
8. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 651 provides: "When a defendant is tried upon a plea of
'not guilty', evidence of insanity or mental defect at the time of the offense shall not
be admissible."
9. "A legal presumption relieves him in whose favor it exists from the necessity
of any proof; but may none the less be destroyed by rebutting evidence; such is the
presumption attaching to the regularity of judicial proceedings; ...that the defen-
dant is sane and responsible for his actions." LA. R.S. 15:432 (1981).
10. For a discussion of these topics, see Note, The Insanity Defense in Louisiana:
Presumptions, Burden of Proof and Appellate Review, 43 LA. L. REV. 1166 (1982).
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is whether due process requires that the present system be main-
tained; if not, the question becomes how much change may be made
without violating due process.
A tenet of constitutional law is that due process requires the
prosecution to prove a criminal case beyond a reasonable doubt: Each
and every element of the offense, as defined by the legislature and
interpreted by the courts, must be proved to the trier of fact beyond
a reasonable doubt." Although intent is an essential element of many
offenses, 2 sanity has been determined not to be such an element (ex-
cept when so defined by the legislature)." Therefore, the prosecution
does not bear the burden of proving a defendant's sanity-at least
such proof is not constitutionally mandated.
However, this conclusion is less than clear and requires further
examination of the distinction between intent and sanity. Sanity
describes a mental condition at a given point in time; intent can be
similarly defined. Thus, the problem is whether one who is insane
is able to form the intent required by law. If not, then sanity would
be an element of any crime requiring intent, and the prosecution would
be required to prove sanity, just as it must prove every other ele-
ment, and to do so beyond a reasonable doubt. The conclusion follows
logically since sanity becomes a prerequisite to the ability to form
intent. Absent legal sanity, there could be no intent and, therefore,
no crime. But, if sanity and intent are independent of one another,
then intent could be formed regardless of the defendant's legal sanity.
Since sanity is an elusive concept, the resolution of this issue is criti-
cally important to criminal prosecutions.
The United States Supreme Court has distinguished the concepts
of sanity and intent." Patterson v. New York 5 recognized this distinc-
tion; that doctrine remains valid today. Inherent in the Court's distinc-
tion is the finding that a person can act intentionally and yet not
necessarily be sane."8 Consider the following illustration:
11. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
12. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
13. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); State v. Lee, 395 So. 2d 700 (La.
1981). "[Slanity is not an element of the Massachusetts crime of murder.... [Therefore
the burden of proof ... and the . . . 'presumption of sanity' . . . do not raise constitu-
tional questions." Walker v. Butterworth, 599 F.2d 1074, 1080 (1st Cir. 1979) (citing
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975);
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). The same is true of Louisiana law. See infra text
accompanying notes 14-25.
14. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
15. Id.; see also State v. Lee, 395 So. 2d 700 (La. 1981).
16. See infra text accompanying note 66.
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A defendant purchases a pistol and some ammunition. Late
one evening, he drives to the residence of his victim, rings
the doorbell and, when the victim answers, shoots five times
at point blank range, killing the victim. The defendant departs,
taking an indirect route home and stopping twice along the
way-once to unload the weapon and later to abandon the
pistol in a roadside ditch. 7
Louisiana law would permit the trier of fact to infer specific intent
from these facts."8 Assuming all other elements of the offense could
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, based upon these facts, the
defendant would be guilty of second degree murder."
Now, consider the same facts and add the following:
The defendant apparently "heard" voices which directed him
to attack the Catholic Church. He made tape recordings and
wrote to the President about a "Catholic conspiracy" to take
over the world. He committed acts of vandalism against
Church buildings and even physically attacked an employee
of a Church agency. His victim was a Catholic priest. A
psychiatrist diagnosed his condition as a form of schizophrenia,
paranoid type. 0
Clearly, a trier of fact also could conclude that this defendant suf-
fered from a mental disease or defect that prevented him from
distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the offense."
Thus the question of whether legal sanity is a prerequisite to form-
ing intent has been answered negatively, since this defendant ap-
parently formed the requisite intent while he was not "legally sane."
Although both intent and sanity are issues which hinge on the
17. These facts are similar to those of State v. Abercrombie, 375 So. 2d 1170,
1172 (La. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 935 (1980).
18. "Criminal intent may be specific or general: (1) Specific criminal intent is that
state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively
desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act."
CRIMINAL-CODE: LA. R.S. 14:10(1) (1974).
19. "Second degree murder is the killing of a human being: (1) When the offender
has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm." CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S.
14:30.1(1) (Supp. 1983).
20. State v. Abercrombie, 375 So. 2d 1170, 1173-74 (La. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 935 (1980).
21. "If the circumstances indicate that because of a mental disease or mental defect
the offender was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference
to the conduct in question, the offender shall be exempt from criminal responsibility."
CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:14 (1974).
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"circumstances"' 2 of each case, insanity requires that there exist a
mental disease or defect in the defendant. Moreover, the ultimate issue
in an insanity defense case is not whether the defendant "actively
desired the prescribed criminal consequences,"" but whether he could
distinguish "between right and wrong"'" at the time. Viewed in this
light, the disparity between intent and sanity becomes clearer. In-
tent remains the burden of the prosecutor-a traditional burden which
demands. proof of the required state of mind to complete the offense;
insanity is the burden of the defendant-a vehicle by which he is not
held criminally responsible, despite having actually committed the act
in question. 5
Sanity need not be an element of an offense unless a state chooses
to make it one; constitutional due process guarantees are not violated
if a state decides not to do so." Sanity is usually not such an ele-
ment, and insanity is normally an affirmative defense. The determina-
tion that sanity is not an essential element gives a state wide latitude
to alter its insanity defense scheme.
Alternatives to the Present System
Abolish the Insanity Defense
Many critics of the insanity defense have advocated the outright
abolition of it." According to these critics, the defense exacts too high
a societal cost. It is often founded on the inexact testimony of
psychiatrists and other mental health professionals whose medical
definitions of sanity do not always comport with the legal definition.
The insanity defense also allows a defendant to win a relatively quick
22. See CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:10(1), :14 (1974), quoted supra notes 18, 21,
respectively.
23. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:10(1) (1974), quoted supra note 18.
24. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:14 (1974), quoted supra note 21.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 35-46.
26. A state legislature is free to define crime as it pleases unless the definition
chosen offends a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197,
202 (1977) (quoting First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 375 U.S. 513
(1958) (jited as Speiser v. Randall in Patterson)).
27. See, e.g., W. WINSLADE & J. Ross, THE INSANITY PLEA: THE USES AND ABUSES
OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1983). The authors argue for the following changes: elimina-
tion of the insanity defense, elimination of most psychiatric testimony from the court-
room, universal adoption of the guilty but mentally ill plea and the separation of the
guilt and penalty phases of a trial when the defendant pleads mental illiness. For
a similar point of view, see T. SZASZ, PRIMARY VALUES AND MAJOR CONTENTIONS 146-50
(R. Vatz & L. Weinberg ed. 1983).
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release in most cases, without being punished for his deeds.
Idaho abolished the insanity defense in 1982,1 perhaps in response
to public sentiment. The mens real' of the common law remains, but
that is no departure from the traditional common law view that there
are certain mental states required to complete certain crimes. Mens
rea is, of course, the traditional common law notion that, in order
to be held criminally responsible for certain behavior, there must be
a "guilty mind" in addition to an unlawful act. The notion has been
carried over into American criminal law and is stated in criminal
statutes as intent, whether general or specific. For example, the mens
rea requirement would preclude criminal punishment of a defendant
for the truly accidental death of another. Idaho apparently would ad-
mit evidence of a mental condition that would negate the defendant's
ability to form the mens rea, but would not permit an insanity defense
short of that.
Since the prosecution must prove all the essential elements of an
offense, including mens rea, the defendant should be allowed to in-
troduce evidence to negate such proof." In a state that permits no
insanity defense, he could produce evidence of his "insanity" to negate
the mens rea, and be acquitted-the only alternative available to the
jury when the element of mens rea has been negated. Since there is no
way for the jury to find him not guilty by reason of insanity (with
subsequent treatment for the mental disease), he will be released into
society without any further care or supervision. This is not an accept-
able result.
Abolition of the insanity defense is analogous to increasing prison
sentences as a means of reducing crime. It has a great deal of popular
appeal, but would likely create more problems than it would solve.
Adopt Another Scheme
Eight states have adopted an alternative verdict in insanity cases:
"guilty but mentally ill."31 This verdict does not permit a defendant
to exonerate himself because of some mental disease or defect, but
it does admit some mitigation of the kind of punishment to be im-
posed rather than turning on responsibility vel non for the offense.
28. ABA STANDING COMM. ON ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND COMM'N
ON THE MENTALLY DISABLED, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Midyear Meeting 1983,
app. 1 (February 9, 1983) [hereinafter cited as ABA COMM. REPORT].
29. See infra text accompanying note 30; see also W. LA FAVE, PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 60 (1978).
30. Due process probably requires that an opportunity be afforded.
31. ABA COMM. REPORT, supra note 28, at 7.
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There are two applications of such an alternative verdict which merit
discussion.
When the guilty but mentally ill verdict supplements a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity, a middle ground is established
whereby the jury may find that the defendant was not so incapacitated
by his mental condition as to exonerate him, but that he did labor
under some mental disease short of such incapacity. 2 The defendant
is then treated for his mental condition prior to confinement in a cor-
rectional institution.
The process of determining appropriate punishment or treatment
is best left to the judge and correctional personnel, who are more
experienced in selecting individualized sentences and treatment. In
these cases, when a jury returns a verdict of guilty but mentally ill,
discretion in sentencing is removed from the judge. The result, that
the defendant is treated for his illness and then incarcerated, may
not be a bad one. But the judge, aided by other professionals, should
make the final decision.
When the guilty but mentally ill verdict supplants the verdict of
not guilty by reason of insanity, the result is about the same as if
the defense were abolished. Under this system, the jury is allowed
to consider evidence of insanity presented by the defendant but, unless
the jury concludes that the defendant could not form the required
mens rea, the verdict means nothing more than that the defendant
will be sentenced to special treatment before imprisonment.
At first blush, this verdict, in either form, attracts popular ap-
proval. It seems to allow the defendant to mitigate his punishment
while also permitting society to extract punishment for the defendant's
misdeed. Closer analysis reveals that the verdict is not all it appears
to be. It does not solve the moral problem of nonresponsibility for
crime;' it only affects the method of treatment and punishment. As
noted by students of the Michigan system, the new scheme simply
does not work.35 "Guilty but mentally ill" is nothing more than a de
facto rejection of the insanity defense.
32. "The verdict is available only where the defendant has asserted the insanity
defense, and only if it is found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty,
he was mentally ill when he committed the offense, but was not 'legally insane' at
that time." MICHIGAN SECOND REVISED CRIMINAL CODE S 705, committee commentary at
88 (Final Draft 1979).
33. See supra text accompanying note 30; see also ABA COMM. REPORT, supra note
28, at 8.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 66-72.
35. See Guilty But Insane Just Means Guilty, NEWSWEEK, April 4, 1983, at 78.
1983]
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Change the Burden of Proof
One of the greatest problems in the Hinkley case was the govern-
ment's burden of proof on the issue of sanity. Under federal law, the
prosecution is required to prove the defendant's sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt once the defendant has placed his sanity at issue. 6
The defendant will prevail if he can produce any evidence of his in-
sanity, unless the prosecution proves the defendant's sanity just as
it must prove every other element of the offense, i.e., beyond a
reasonable doubt. Twenty-four states have adopted similar schemes. 7
This system is constitutionally permissible because whether sanity
is to be an essential element is a matter of legislative discretion."
Each of these states has consciously adopted this rule and has will-
ingly accepted the burden of proof.
This system probably best highlights public discontent concern-
ing the insanity defense. It is a logical, and in Louisiana, a statutory
tenet that people are sane until proven otherwise." Consequently, it
seems far more proper to require someone to prove his insanity rather
than to make the state prove his sanity.
The alternative to placing the burden of proof on the prosecution
is to place it upon the defendant, but constitutional limitations on the
state's ability to do so must be considered. Oregon formerly required
that the defendant prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt,"°
and that scheme was validated by the United States Supreme Court."
Although adopting such an extreme degree of proof and placing the
burden upon a defendant is permissible, it seems today to offend tradi-
tional American notions of justice. Only the prosecution is believed
to have to prove anything beyond a reasonable doubt; it seems drastic
indeed to place such a burden upon the defendant. Apparently, no
state is willing to do so now." Oregon amended its laws in 1971 to
place a lesser burden of proof of insanity upon a defendant.' But,
despite the trend away from placing such a strenuous burden upon
36. Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895); see, e.g., United States v. Phillips,
519 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1975); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2.
37. ABA Comm. REPORT, supra note 28, at 6; but sec Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 207 n.10 (1977) (twenty-eight states). In Patterson, Justice White observed that
the trend in insanity cases is for the prosecution to shoulder the burden of proof. Id.
38. See supra note 26.
39. LA. R.S. 15:432 (1981), quoted supra note 9.
40. OR. CoMP. LAWS 1940, S 26-929 (repealed 1971).
41. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
42. ABA CoMM. REPORT, supra note 28, at app. 1.
43. OR. REV. STAT. S 161.055 (1971).
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the defendant, it remains a plausible alternative for a legislature in-
tent upon severely restricting the use of the insanity defense. Adop-
tion of this alternative should be approached with caution as it, in
effect, does away with the defense in all but the most severe cases.
The most accepted burden of proof in insanity cases is proof by
a preponderance of the evidence, with the burden upon the defen-
dant. Louisiana" and twenty-six other states 5 utilize this system. The
American Bar Association recently has endorsed the scheme in cer-
tain circumstances."
Under Louisiana's present insanity defense system, a defendant
must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he labored under
a mental disease or defect which prevented him from distinguishing
between right and wrong. If he is successful, he should be found not
guilty by reason of insanity. The state may counter the defendant's
evidence, either on rebuttal or in its case in chief. If the state prevails
on the issue of insanity, that is, if it produces evidence that
preponderates over the defendant's, and all essential elements of the
offense are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant should
be convicted.' 7
This system has a logical appeal. It combines the idea of
non-responsibility for criminal acts committed by those who are men-
tally defective with a concern for removing from society those who
violate its laws. Society retains the burden of proving the defendant's
guilt and permits him to escape culpability without placing an undue
burden upon him. Given the alternatives of abolishing the insanity
defense in toto or adopting some other scheme, Louisiana's present
system is the most favorable to the defendant in that it provides a
method for complete exoneration. At the same time, Louisiana's system
preserves, without too high a societal cost, society's interest in not
punishing those who cannot be held morally accountable.
Change the Test of Legal Insanity
Since insanity is a legal concept, rather than a medical concept,"'
44. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
45. ABA COMM. REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.
46. ABA Delegates OK New Test for Insanity, State Times (Baton Rouge), Feb.
10, 1983, at B8, col. 1. The American Bar Association endorsed placing the burden
of proof on the defendant only when the test for insanity included a volitional as well
as a cognitive test; otherwise the burden remains on the state. See infra note 52 and
accompanying text.
47. Note, supra note 10, at 1179.
48. Only lawyers use the term "insanity" in a technical sense. Psychiatrists and
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it must be defined in legal terms. Several tests have been advanced
by which the defendant's sanity vel non can be judged; 9 these tests
generally can be classified as those having only a cognitive element
and those having both a cognitive and a volitional element. The
cognitive aspect of a test addresses whether the defendant could
discern that his conduct was contrary to society's expectations. The
volitional aspect of a test concerns whether the defendant could adhere
to the right or conform his conduct to the law.
A combined cognitive-volitional test was once thought to be a pro-
gressive view of the insanity defense; yet, it has caused numerous
problems. As difficult as it might be for a jury to determine if a defend-
ant labored under a mental disease which precluded him from distin-
guishing between right and wrong,5° it is much more difficult to decide
whether the same defendant was able to adhere to the right.
Louisiana adopted what has been called a "modified M'Naghten"
rule, a cognitive test which is a paraphrased version of the traditional
M'Naghten test.5' The "right from wrong" standard embodied in the
M'Naghten rule provided for many years a relatively simple standard
by which the defendant's insanity could be judged. Problems later
developed when volitional tests were adopted. In a "right from wrong"
other mental health professionals would define various mental diseases and conditions
but would be unable to provide a technical definition for "insanity." "[C]hoice of a
test of legal sanity involves not only scientific knowledge but questions of basic policy
as to the extent to which that knowledge should determine criminal responsibility."
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801 (1952).
49. See for example the M'Naghten rule:
Every man is presumed to be sane ... ; to establish a defense on the ground
of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing
of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason,
from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what
was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843). See the test in the MODEL PENAL CODE
S 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962): "A person is not responsible for criminal con-
duct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." See the Durham test: "An
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or mental defect." Durham v. United States, 214 F2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
50. ABA COMM. REPORT, supra note 28, at 4-5.
51. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:14 (1974), quoted supra note 21. Louisiana deleted
from the traditional rule the following language: "or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong." The M'Naghten rule, supra note 49. The
deleted language is also cognitive. There is no provision in the M'Naghten rule for
consideration of the defendant's ability to conform to a certain standard of conduct.
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case, the jury can rely on the behavior of the defendant and, perhaps,
some testimonial evidence to decide whether the defendant suffered
from a mental disease or defect. It is quite another matter for the
jury to determine, under a volitional test, whether an individual was
unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law or
whether he acted under an irresistible impulse.
The problems caused by volitional tests have been recognized by
the American Bar Association.2 The group recently has changed its
policy on the insanity defense and conditionally adopted a cognitive
test similar to the traditional M'Naghten rule.u
Utilizing only this traditional cognitive test does no violence to
the goals of the insanity defense-it still allows a defendant to be
relieved of criminal responsibility when he cannot distinguish between
right and wrong. Moreover, the test is less speculative than one which
requires a jury to decide if a defendant could conform to a certain
standard of conduct or whether his acts were the product of a mental
disease. "[T]here is still no accurate scientific basis for measuring one's
capacity for self-control or for calibrating the impairment of such
capacity.'" There is a great difference indeed between an irresistible
impulse and an impulse that is not resisted. The abolition of volitional
tests obviates the problems inherent in such distinctions.
Louisiana, with its modified M'Naghten rule, now appears to be
at the forefront of modern thought as to the legal test for insanity.
Permitting the trier of fact to decide whether the defendant could
distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the alleged act,
without regard for his ability to conform to the right, is a time-proven
and effective method by which to test legal sanity. Louisiana's courts
are experienced in applying this test. It should not be changed without
a compelling reason-one which, for the moment at least, does not
exist.
Adopt a "Diminished Capacity" Rule
The present Louisiana scheme envisions an "all or nothing"' , ap-
proach. The defendant must either plead "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity" and attempt to introduce evidence of a mental disease or defect
(to prove that he did not know right from wrong) or else abandon
52. ABA COMM. REPORT, supra note 28, at 4-5.
53. ABA, SUMMARY OF ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, Midyear Meeting 1983,
at 3 (Recommendation 1) [hereinafter cited as ABA, SUMMARY OF ACTION].
54. ABA COMM. REPORT, supra note 28, at 5.
55. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 651, comment (a).
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the opportunity to produce evidence of his mental condition at the
time of the alleged offense. The Code of Criminal Procedure is clear
as to the legislature's intent: "When a defendant is tried upon a plea
of 'not guilty,' evidence of insanity or mental defect at the time of
the offense shall not be admissible.
5 6
Without totally abandoning the insanity defense scheme now in
use, Louisiana could offer to certain defendants the chance to mitigate
the degree of punishment or severity of the offense by permitting
a "partial insanity" defense. In specific intent cases,57 evidence of a
mental condition which precluded the defendant from forming the req-
uisite intent could be allowed in order to reduce the grade of the
offense charged. The defendant would not be relieved from all respon-
sibility, since lesser included offenses not requiring specific intent
would be available as responsive verdicts. The jury's task would be
to decide only if the defendant could form the needed specific intent
and not whether the defendant knew right from wrong at the time
of the offense. Since the defendant would not be required to plead
"not guilty by reason of insanity," the affirmative defense of insanity
would not be an issue and "not guilty by reason of insanity" would
not be an available verdict in such cases; therefore, there is little
danger of a jury confusing these issues.
There have been forceful arguments in both directions on whether
Louisiana should adopt a "diminished capacity" rule. Some members
of the bench have expressed the opinion that a defendant must be
allowed an opportunity to prove lack of intent due to a mental condi-
tion if due process is to be satisfied.58 Others, however, see a dimin-
ished responsibility test as risky; such a test might tend to infuse
into every specific intent case expert testimony as to whether or not
* the defendant could form the intent required by law." The drafters
of the controlling Code of Criminal Procedure article voiced a fear
of confusion. They doubted that a jury could differentiate between
grades of mental disorders and were afraid a jury could be confused
by the evidence and by the court's necessarily complex instructions. 0
Clearly, this concern would be well taken in diminished capacity cases
when insanity is raised as an affirmative defense as well as proof of
56. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 651.
57. Specific intent crimes are those such as first and second degree murder, ag-
gravated burglary and simple burglary. Attempts to commit crimes also require specific
intent. See, e.g., CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:30, :30.1, :60, :62, :27.
58. State v. Lecompte, 371 So. 2d 239, 244 (La. 1979) (Calogero, J., dissenting).
59. State v. Lecompte, 371 So. 2d 239, 245 (La. 1979) (on rehearing).
60. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 651, comment (a).
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a lack of intent. In such cases, both issues (exoneration based upon
insanity and inability to form the requisite intent) would be before
the jury, and there would be a greater likelihood of confusion. The
number of these cases is likely to be small, however, especially in
view of the fact that insanity is raised as a defense in proportionate-
ly few criminal cases.
Despite the Louisiana legislature's refusal to include a partial
responsibility doctrine in the criminal law of the state, there is some
historical foundation for doing so. Since Louisiana criminal law is
derived from the common law, it is proper to look to English tradi-
tion to determine the origin of diminished responsibility. The concept
apparently was first described by Sir Matthew Hale in the seven-
teenth century. Hale distinguished "partial insanity of mind" from "a
total insanity." While somewhat ahead of his time in this view, Hale
also recognized the effects of the distinction: partial insanity, he
thought, would excuse a crime but would be a "matter of great
difficulty."'" Hale envisioned the same problems in application of these
concepts by a jury that are anticipated today.
Another valid argument in favor of the adoption of such a provi-
sion is simply that, "[ilt is difficult to determine by what process of
reasoning some courts can decide that self-produced intoxication is
a proper matter for consideration by the jury in determining whether
the mental elements [of specific intent crimes] are present but that
mental disease cannot be considered." 2 The merit of this argument
lies in the source of the defenses of intoxication and insanity. Loui-
siana law permits voluntary intoxication to exempt an offender from
criminal responsibility for a specific intent crime. A mental disease
or defect, presumably a condition that is involuntary, does not ex-
empt an offender from the same offense. The result is inconsistent,
especially since the underlying rationale of the intoxication defense
is that the condition precludes formation of intent. If one can volun-
tarily induce such a condition, it should follow that an involuntarily
induced mental illness should produce the same results.2
Although a diminished capacity rule would seem to clutter the
court system in all specific intent cases, the rule is a middle ground
between a hard-line insanity defense and none at all. Proof of dimin-
61. II H. VETTER & R. RIEBER, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 146 (1980).
62. M. GUTTMACHER, THE ROLE OF PSYCHIATRY IN LAW 49 (1968) (quoting Edmund
Keedy, an advocate of partial responsibility).
63. See the reporter's comment to LA. R.S. 14:15 for a less than satisfactory reason
for the different treatments of voluntary intoxication and mental disease.
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ished capacity does not always exonerate the defendant; only the
degree of his crime is reduced. Upon conviction of the lesser offense,
he may be confined in a correctional institution rather than hospital-
ized, as is often the case when a defendant successfully asserts a
defense of "not guilty by reason of insanity."
Given that very few criminal trials involve insanity as an issue,
it would not be unduly burdensome to permit evidence of a defen-
dant's diminished capacity. Proof of diminished capacity is at least
as reliable as proof of insanity; it may even be more reliable than
proof of voluntary intoxication since expert testimony will nearly
always be involved.
One other advantage to the defendant should be mentioned. If
a diminished capacity rule is adopted, it would not replace the in-
sanity defense. However, it would allow a defendant to introduce
evidence of a mental condition which precludes the formation of
specific intent without having to plead "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity" (and, in effect, admitting the act with which he is charged, even
if such a plea does not amount to an admission of guilt). He would
still be required to give notice of intent to introduce such evidence,"4
but he would not labor under the burden of having "admitted" the
act in an attempt to mitigate his culpability.
On balance, it is 'both logical and realistic to adopt such a rule,
and the legislature should give serious consideration to amending the
Code of Criminal Procedure to permit evidence of diminished capa-
city in specific intent cases.
The Dilemma of Moral Responsibility
Despite the number of choices available to the legislature in seek-
ing the proper method of dealing with criminal insanity cases, the
ultimate decisions must be founded upon society's desire to continue
to attach moral culpability to crime. The issue is whether society
wishes to continue to make moral responsibility a prerequisite for con-
viction and punishment. If so, then it is imperative that the law pro-
vide some way to identify those who should not be held criminally
responsible for a prohibited act.
64. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 726. The language of this article, while not directly
creating a rule of diminished capacity, is curious nonetheless. The defendant is re-
quired to file a notice of his intent to use evidence relating to an "other condition
bearing upon the issue of whether he has the mental state required for the offense
charged." Perhaps this is an inadvertent reference to diminished capacity, whereby
proof to negate specific intent would be admitted, that specific intent being the "men-
tal state required for the offense charged."
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Rooted deep in legal history is the development of the concept
of guilt as being more than simply having committed a socially con-
demned act. The law requires a "guilty mind," which presupposes a
mind capable of entertaining the sort of disposition toward the act
that offends society. 5 In order to foster the idea that a person can
be held not responsible for his actions under certain circumstances,
the criminal law has devised a number of defenses which alone do
not prove the innocence of the defendant. On the contrary, these
defenses serve merely to relieve the defendant of societal retribution
when he has, in fact, done what the law proscribes. As Judge David
Bazelon has stated, "culpability and intent are not synonymous; even
an individual who intentionally engages in unlawful conduct may be
non-culpable when the law itself is deemed unjust by the community
or when the reasons for the defendant's conduct serve as a justifica-
tion or excuse."' Chief Justice John Dixon of the Louisiana Supreme
Court followed that thought when dissenting in an insanity case: "A
civilized people should not ascribe legal responsibility to such an in-
sane person even if he kills a Catholic priest. Our law does not per-
mit it."67
Well in advance of the trial of Daniel M'Naghten in 1843, civil-
ized peoples had indeed recognized that there should be some occa-
sions on which a defendant should not be held responsible. Early
Mohammedan law provided punishments for certain crimes, but
excluded from punishment those persons who were not in full posses-
sion of their faculties.' Even the Draconian Code differentiated between
murder and involuntary homicide, reflecting a recognition of
differences in state of mind of the perpetrator at the time of the act. 9
Later, Roman law also recognized a distinction between these same
grades of homicide, providing a lesser punishment for the involun-
tary variety." The distinction was clearly based upon the "guilty mind"
of the perpetrator. Still later, beginning with the Renaissance, man's
understanding of his own mind and the relationship of intent to
society's interest in punishing crime became clearer until the com-
mon law formally recognized the insanity defense in M'Naghten's
Case.7
1
Judeo-Christian development should be added to this historical
65. See supra text accompanying note 29.
66. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 397 (1976).
67. State v. Abercrombie, 375 So. 2d 1170, 1179 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
68. J. BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 40 (1955).
69. Id. at 42.
70. Id. at 48-49.
71. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
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litany, especially development after the Roman Empire. Certainly there
was a profound impact of ecclesiastical law upon the civil law,
especially with regard to the concepts of free will and sin. Recogni-
tion of the necessity of free will to sin and to the actions of man
generally was not inconsistent with the theory that nonspiritual ac-
tions should also be judged by some notion of voluntarism. Insanity,
to our way of thinking, destroys free will, and, therefore, one who
acts while insane will not be held morally accountable.
The relationship of free will to culpability for one's actions has
become a cornerstone of our entire criminal justice system. Punish-
ment as a deterrent for criminal acts is based upon this doctrine-
one who is in control of his faculties and can choose freely is likely
to be deterred by sure and swift punishment. An offender who com-
mits a crime while laboring under a mental disease that affects his
free exercise of will cannot be deterred by the threat of punishment.
In a recent article in the American Bar Association Journal,
Richard J. Bonnie summarized the result of these many centuries of
development:
The historical evolution of the insanity defense has been
influenced by the ebb and flow of informed opinion concern-
ing scientific understanding of mental illness and its relation
to criminal behavior. But it is well to remember that, at bot-
tom, the debate about the insanity defense and the idea of
criminal responsibility raises fundamentally moral questions,
not scientific ones. As Lord Hale observed three centuries ago,
in History of Pleas of the Crown, the ethical foundations of
the criminal law are rooted in beliefs about human rationality,
deterrability and free will. But these are articles of moral faith
rather than scientific fact.
Some critics of the insanity defense believe that mentally
ill persons are. not substantially less able to control their
behavior than normal persons and that, in any case, a decent
respect for the dignity of those persons requires that they
be held accountable for their wrong doing on the same terms
as everyone else. On the other hand, proponents of the defense
.. . believe that it is fundamentally wrong to condemn and
punish a person whose rational control over his or her behavior
was impaired by the incapacitating effects of severe mental
illness."2
72. Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 195 (Feb.
1983); see generally Fingarette, Insanity and Responsibility, in PSYCHIATRY AND ETHICS:




Given the broad permissible constitutional boundaries within which
Louisiana could modify its insanity defense scheme and the intense
public dissatisfaction with the defense in general, the temptation to
make changes in the law is great. Yet, there is no need to change
a system which now appears to be the most acceptable of the available
alternatives. Each of the alternatives, with the exception of the no-
tion of diminished capacity, suffers from one or more defects that
makes it unacceptable and certainly less preferable than the present
law.
Moreover, appellate courts are in a position to insure that the
insanity defense is fairly applied. Jackson v. Virginia"m pronounced
a test for review of evidence in criminal appeals; that test was ap-
plied to the insanity defense in Moore v. Duckworth.' A reviewing
court must examine the evidence of the defendant's insanity and deter-
mine whether a reasonable juror could conclude that the defendant
was insane at the time of the offense. Applying this test to each case
permits an appellate court to insure that the test for insanity and
burden of proof are properly applied."5
In the final analysis, Louisiana should resist the temptation to
adopt other insanity defense schemes, particularly one that would ex-
change "not guilty by reason of insanity" for "guilty but mentally ill."7"
Study should be made of the possibility of adopting a diminished
capacity rule, but only after care is taken to tailor it to the needs
of the state. If adopted, the rule should be narrowly defined and writ-
ten so as to meld with the other provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure regarding insanity.
Moral responsibility77 for crime is a matter of public policy. Loui-
siana's insanity defense scheme acknowledges and implements society's
recognition that there are those among us who should not be punished
73. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
74. 443 U.S. 713 (1979).
75. There is some authority for the appellate court to order a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity when it finds that the evidence, under the Jackson standard,
supports the defendant's plea. State v. Byrd, 385 So. 2d 248 (La. 1980), supports the
rendering of a lesser included (responsive) verdict rather than another trial when the
evidence falls short of the offense charged but satisfies the elements of a lesser in-
cluded offense. Whether a court would be willing to use a similar procedure in in-
sanity cases remains to be seen.
76. See ABA, SUMMARY OF ACTION, supra note 53, at 3 (adoption of Recommenda-
tion Three).
77. For an excellent article discussing some of the suggestions addressed herein,
see Bonnie, supra note 72.
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criminally for acts which violate the law. We have preserved a corner-
stone of society-moral culpability-and we should be reluctant to
abandon it.
Instead of changing the test for legal sanity or modifying the
burden of proof, the legislature would be well advised to consider
higher standards for release of those found "not guilty by reason of
insanity"78 and, perhaps, a system of post-release probation that would
encourage further treatment and deter similar conduct in the future.79
Harry J. Philips, Jr.
78. LA. CODE CRIM. P. arts. 654-658.
79. By Act 689 of 1982, the Louisiana legislature mandated that, prior to release
pursuant to LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 657, the court file written findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law. This article permits the court to release a defendant on probation. The
burden of proof is on the defendant to show that he is no longer a danger to himself
or to others, or that he is a suitable candidate for probation.
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